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Abstract
In the UNIX/Linux environment the kernel can log every command process created by every user using process
accounting. This data has many potential uses, including the investigation of security incidents.  However, process 
accounting data is also sensitive since it contains private user information. Consequently, security system 
administrators have been hindered from sharing these logs. Given that many interesting security applications 
could use process accounting data, it would be useful to have a tool that could protect private user information 
in the logs. For this reason we introduce SCRUB-PA, a tool that uses multi-level multi-dimensional 
anonymization on process accounting log files in order to provide different levels of privacy protection.  It is 
our goal that SCRUB-PA will promote the sharing of process accounting logs while preserving privacy. 
Keywords: process accounting, data anonymization, data sanitization, privacy preserving, data mining, 
security data sharing
1.0 Introduction
 The UNIX/Linux accounting system collects information on individual/group usage of computer system
resources. A system can record every process created by every user. This logged data is called process accounting 
and has been found to be useful for several security purposes [1,6,8], some of which we list below:
 To hold a use accountable for some action indicated in the logs
 To enable the extraction of patterns of use of objects, users or security mechanisms in the system
 To identify security policy violations.
 To create an audit trail of the use (or abuse) that may occur from a specific user.
 To prevent the users from abusing the system by acting as a deterrent, given that the users know that 
there is a mechanism that logs security relevant actions in the system
While this work is motivated by the sharing of process accounting for security operations, there are other 
purposes for sharing process accounting data. For example: (1) process accounting has long been the primary 
data source for usage billing on allocated computer systems, and (2) process accounting data is an accurate 
source for workload characterization needed to tune applications and schedulers [1,4,5].   However, there are 
concerns about information disclosure when sharing process accounting data from a specific source since 
sensitive information will be included in the logs.
We present a tool, SCRUB-PA, to anonymize process accounting log data. Using this tool, the user can 
anonymize whatever field he/she considers to be sensitive at multiple desired level (e.g., removing all the 
information, adding noise, or permuting the data).  These multi-level anonymization techniques can be 
employed on different fields—with varying effects on the statistical properties of the overall log.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents general background on process accounting. 
Section 3 provides a description of the general anonymization methods used in SCRUB-PA. In Section 4, we 
step through all the specific anonymization options in SCRUB-PA for each field in a process accounting record.  
We conclude with a summary in Section 5.
2.0 Background on Process Accounting
2.1 Process Accounting
UNIX/LINUX can log every process executed by every user. This kind of logging is called process accounting and 
is generally used in high performance computing (HPC) environments to bill individual users (or groups of 
users) for the amount of CPU time that they consume [2,7].
Process accounting can be used for security purposes, for instance after a break-in to help determine what 
commands a user executed, correlating evidence, and incident investigation. Furthermore, process accounting 
can also be used for other innocuous purposes, such as seeing if anyone is using old unsupported or vulnerable 
software that should be deleted or determining who is playing games on the fileserver.
Process accounting is performed by the UNIX kernel. Every time a process terminates, the kernel writes a 32-
byte record to the /var/adm/acct or /var/adm/pacct file that includes:
• name of the user and group who created the process
• first eight characters of the name of the command which launched the process
• elapsed time and processor time used by the process 
• time that the process exited
• memory usage 
• number of disk blocks read or written on behalf of the process
• flags, including:
– S: Process was executed by the superuser.
– F: Process ran after a fork, but without an exec.
– D: Process generated a core file when it exited.
– X: Process was terminated by signal
 Here is the common structure for the process accounting file (in C code): 
struct acct
  {
    char ac_flag;                       /* Accounting flags.  */
    u_int16_t ac_uid;                   /* Accounting user ID.  */
    u_int16_t ac_gid;                   /* Accounting group ID.  */
    u_int16_t ac_tty;                   /* Controlling tty.  */
    u_int32_t ac_btime;                 /* Beginning time.  */
    comp_t ac_utime;                    /* Accounting user time.  */
    comp_t ac_stime;                    /* Accounting system time.  */
    comp_t ac_etime;                    /* Accounting elapsed time.  */
    comp_t ac_mem;                      /* Accounting average memory usage.  */
    comp_t ac_io;                       /* Accounting chars transferred.  */
    comp_t ac_rw;                       /* Accounting blocks read or written.  */
    comp_t ac_minflt;                   /* Accounting minor pagefaults.  */
    comp_t ac_majflt;                   /* Accounting major pagefaults.  */
    comp_t ac_swaps;                    /* Accounting number of swaps.  */
    u_int32_t ac_exitcode;              /* Accounting process exitcode.  */
    char ac_comm[ACCT_COMM+1];          /* Accounting command name.  */
    char ac_pad[10];                    /* Accounting padding bytes.  */
  };
The accounting file /var/adm/pacct is accessed by many of the accounting utilities used with system accounting. 
For example the lastcomm or acctcom program displays the contents of this file in a human-readable format, as it 
can be seen in Figure 1.
sendmail F root __ 0.05 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
mail S daemon __ 0.34 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
send - dfr __ 0.05 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
post - dfr ttysf 0.11 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
sendmail F root __ 0.09 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
sendmail F root __ 0.23 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
sendmail F root __ 0.02 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
anno - dfr ttys1 0.14 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
sendmail F root __ 0.03 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
mail S daemon __ 0.30 secs Sat Mar 11 13:28
Figure 1.  ASCII Process Accounting Output from lastcomm or acctcom Utilities
Table 1 shows a list of utilities that display, report, and summarize process information. 
Table 1. Process Accounting Utilities
ckpacct Controls the size of the /var/adm/pacct file. 
monacct Uses the daily reports created by the utilities above to produce monthly summary 
reports. 
shutacct Records the time accounting was turned off by calling the acctwtmp utility to write a 
line to the /var/adm/wtmp file. It then calls the turnacct off utility to turn off 
process accounting. 
acctcom Displays process accounting summaries. (available to all users). 
accton Turns process accounting on and off.
time Prints real time, user time, and system time required to execute a utility.
lastcomm Displays information about the last processes that were executed. 
The acctcom utility is one of the most useful tools for getting a quick report from the system. It can be used to 
show all the processes that have been executed by a specific user, or to show all the processes, for any user, 
running longer than x seconds etc.
$ acctcom -u (username)
$ acctcom -O 20
System accounting processes generate a number of automated reports that can assist the systems administrator 
in auditing the daily usage of a system. The Daily Command Summary (DCS) report and Total Command 
Summary (TCS) report can be found in the /var/adm/acct/nite directory and hold several aggregative statistics. 
The TCS report is stored in an ASCII file called daycms and can be viewed with any available text viewer or 
editor, as shown in Figure 2.
TOTAL COMMAND SUMMARY
COMMAND      NUMBER    TOTAL     TOTAL    TOTAL       MEAN     MEAN       HOG       CHARS    BLOCKS
 NAME         CMDS   KCOREMIN   CPU-MIN  REAL-MIN    SIZE-K   CPU-MIN    FACTOR    TRNSFD     READ
TOTALS           82     12.68      0.06     21.91    209.92      0.00      0.28 6.636e+06      0.00
man               1      7.56      0.02      1.68    440.00      0.02      1.02 5.566e+06      0.00
vi                1      2.24      0.02      0.53    121.00      0.02      3.49  71936.00      0.00
ls                5      1.15      0.01      0.02    108.15      0.00     68.33 117144.00      0.00
fgrep            14      0.39      0.00      0.01    124.17      0.00     42.86 286776.00      0.00
tail             14      0.36      0.00      0.02    126.82      0.00     18.03 142744.00      0.00
bsh               6      0.28      0.00      0.01     99.27      0.00     27.50  49410.00      0.00
ps                1      0.21      0.00      0.00    137.00      0.00     66.67  19696.00      0.00
ftpd              1      0.20      0.00      0.81    155.00      0.00      0.16  41576.00      0.00
sendmail          1      0.12      0.00      0.00    468.00      0.00    100.00  13744.00      0.00
fwtmp             3      0.07      0.00      0.00    143.00      0.00     25.00  35840.00      0.00
more              2      0.05      0.00      2.41    195.00      0.00      0.01  30144.00      0.00
pg                3      0.03      0.00     14.78     28.50      0.00      0.01  61232.00      0.00
ksh               2      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00  18360.00      0.00
Figure 2.  Example Summary Process Accounting Report
2.2  Process Accounting Limitations
Process accounting data is subject to some inherent limitations with respect to security monitoring. For our 
purposes, we note two such limitations here. The first limitation is that process accounting does not keep track 
of parameters passed with the executed command. In fact, it only keeps track of the first eight characters of the 
command executed. Based on this, a malicious user could link a malicious tool to one with an innocent name 
and then execute the linked file.
$ ln autohack inoccent_prog
$ ./inoccent_prog
Furthermore, the file /var/adm/acct  where all the process accounting data is stored could be altered or even 
deleted by a malicious attacker who has superuser access, thus removing all evidence of an “attack”. This 
limitation can be addressed by setting up a script running by cron that copies the specific file to a different 
server that would be used as a log data warehouse.
3.0 Anonymization Methods
Several anonymization algorithms used in the tool SCRUB-PA are reused multiple times in the context of 
different process accounting fields.  The goal of this section is to introduce detailed descriptions of these 
general anonymization algorithms here for referral when later in the paper an anonymization method is 
mentioned in context for a specific process accounting field. 
3.1 Black Marker Anonymization
In the black marker anonymization method, all the information of the field is deleted. This is done simply by 
replacing every value of that field with a predefined constant matching the value type expected in the field to be 
changed.  Since all the original information in the field is eliminated, this method results in 100 percent 
information loss.
3.2 Pure Randomization
We use pure randomization to describe truly random permutations. This means it is possible create any valid 
permutation. To accomplish this, we make use of tables to store the mappings between unanonymized and the 
corresponding anonymized values.  Because the creation of the table is dependent upon both the state of the 
PRNG and actual log being anonymized—specifically field values and the order in which they appear—
mappings will be different every time this algorithm is run.  If mappings must be consistent between different 
logs that are anonymized, we recommend the use of keyed randomization.
3.3 Keyed Randomization
With keyed randomization the mapping from unanonymized to anonymized data is well-defined by a small key.  
Thus mappings are consistent between different logs anonymized with this method at different times—as long 
as the same key is used.  We implement this method with keyed hashes (Also, called HMACs). The result of 
this implementation is that the data is no longer permuted.  However, collisions are low, and hence it is nearly a 
one-to-one correspondence between unanonymized and anonymized values.
3.4 Grouping
In the grouped anonymization method, every original value is replaced with a label value representing one 
predefined subset group to which the original value belongs. In other words, the complete set of values is 
partitioned, and a canonical member of each equivalence class is chosen to replace all values from that 
equivalence class. The equivalence classes in the partition do not need to be of equal cardinality and can be 
formed arbitrarily by developers as long as the user is informed of the partitioning method within SCRUB-PA.  
This method makes four assumptions (1-3 are just the definition of a partition):
1. the range of all possible original values is known, 
2. the union of all subset groups contains all possible values,
3. the subsets chosen are mutually exclusive, and
4. the representative label value for each subset must be an element of that subset.
For example, if the range of all possible original values are the integers 1–30 inclusive, then we could partition 
the set into the following subsets: subset A =[1–10], subset B =[11–20], and subset C =[21–30]. The 
representative label values for A, B and C could be 5, 15, and 25, respectively. 
3.5 Truncation
In the truncation method, each original value is replaced with the value truncated at a predefined truncation 
point. To truncate a value, we simply delete everything after the truncation point. Note, truncation is really just 
a special type of grouping where subgroups are created by truncating.   Furthermore, all of these subsets are the 
same size for a given truncation point. Truncation is a flexible method since it allows the user to choose the 
amount of information that she wants to reveal by selecting the most appropriate truncation point.  The more 
truncation points available to the user, the finer the granularity of control given to the user.
For example, assume the original data are timestamps in the form of year:month:day:hour:minute:second.  Truncation 
points are logical in between the year and month, the month and day, the day and hour, the hour and minute, 
and the minute and second. If the original value is: 2005:12:21:17:55:07  
truncation at seconds yields:  2005:12:21:17:55:00  
truncation at minutes yields: 2005:12:21:17:00:00  
truncation at hours yields: 2005:12:21:00:00:00
truncation at days yields: 2005:12:00:00:00:00
truncation at months yields: 2005:00:00:00:00:00
truncation at years yields: 0000:00:00:00:00:00
3.6 Random Shift
With the random shift method, every original value is replaced with a new value that is the original value plus a 
random number from a predefined range. We assume that is the data can be assigned numerical values, and 
shift numbers are not allowed that overflow the field. The user must select the upper and the lower limits of 
the random shift. One achieves more security using a larger window and thus choosing from a larger pool of 
numbers by which to shift.  However, large shift numbers may make data look unrealistic.  For example, a 
random shift in time may put timestamps a million years into the future.  If one does not want to reveal 
anonymization has been performed, they must create an upper limit. Note, since we control the shift number as 
not to overflow a field, order is always preserved.
3.7  Enumeration 
The enumeration method applies exclusively to timestamps. The result is that all temporal information is 
removed except for the order in which the events occurred. This means that unsorted logs must be sorted 
chronologically. Since perfect sorting on a large log is slow and sorting a streamed log is impossible, we make 
an approximation that works as long as logs are never terribly disordered. This is a reasonable assumption as 
most logs are sorted and disorder occurs only because of clock skew between sensors and travel time of alerts 
over the network. We implement this local sorting through the use of a sliding window based sorting algorithm.
The size of this window determines the amount of entries to locally buffer and sort. After each local sort within 
the window is performed, the window advances one place in the log and another local sort is performed. This 
continues until the window hits the end of the log. Suppose that a log is known to have no out of order entries 
further than n records apart. In this case, if record A occurs more than n entries before record B, then we know 
A is less than B.  Such a log could be sorted perfectly using a window of size n. In general, one does not know 
the maximum distance between two out of order entries, but an upper bound can be assumed or estimated. 
Even if one cannot estimate, or the bound is too large, they can chose the buffer size to trade-off between 
accuracy and algorithm speed.
3.8 Default Settings and Selecting/Unselecting Anonymization Methods
When a field is selected to be anonymized, SCRUB-PA sets the top anonymization option as the default option. 
The anonymization option for each field is confirmed by the user clicking the OK button at the bottom of the 
window. If no anonymization (no change) is decided upon even though the anonymization window is open, 
the user can select no change by clicking on the X in the upper righthand corner of the window to close the
window. If an anonymization option is selected for a particular field and later the user changes his/her mind 
then this selection can be reversed by clicking again on the selected field to un-select anonymization of this 
field.  
  
4.0   Using SCRUB-PA 
SCRUB-PA can be downloaded from
<http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/Scrub-PADownLoad.html>
where there is documentation on installation.  
4.1 Input / Output
The first step in using SCRUB-PA is selecting an input file containing process accounting data.  Figure 3A 
shows the main menu with the input file selection window highlighted.  The input file name can be typed in or 
filled in by selecting it through the file browser.  The output file can be designated similarly.  Figure 3A also 
shows the main menu with the output file selection window highlighted. If an existing file is selected then 
SCRUB-PA will verify with a user window whether the file should be overwritten.
Figure 3B shows the task summary window that appears immediately after the anonymization tasks are 
complete and an output file has been created. The task summary window documents all the anonymization 
operations and parameters performed on the input file resulting in the output file (except for the seed keys 
which are not documented).   This metadata about anonymization operations on a specific input-to-output file 
transaction can be saved or printed to provide a record for future reference since no metadata is kept in the 
processing accounting files themselves.   
                                (a)                                                                   (b)
Figure 3.  SCRUB-PA Main Graphical User Interfaces:
  (a) main menu with file I/O fields highlighted
(b) task summary window after anonymization is complete
The remainder of this section will go into depth describing the anonymization options available for each 
process accounting field.
4.2 Command Name Anonymization [Field 1]
The first field in a processing account record for potential anonymization is the “Command Name” field.  
While this field is potentially the most valuable field for analyzing user behavior (when mapped to User IDs or 
Group IDs), there may be situations when it is desirable to look at other behavior (such as time usage) 
independent of what commands are executed. When the Command Names are mapped to User IDs and 
Group IDs, this field potentially has the most sensitive information since it reveals behavior.  This field is 
defined as follows:
ac_comm: command name
The “Command Name” field has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping.  Figure 4 shows the Command Name field’s GUI for anonymization 
options.  By clicking in the circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option 
will become highlighted/darken while the other unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options 
for each field are mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  
Although one anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no 
anonymization option needs to be selected.
Figure 4. Command Name Anonymization GUI
“Command Name” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
Using this method, our tool replaces every command name from the log with the label “command”.
“Command Name” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
In this method, our tool replaces every command name with the label “COMMxxxx”, where xxxx is a distinct 
integer. The first command in the log will be replaced by “COMM1”, the second by “COMM2”, and so on.
“Command Name” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original command value 
in the field to a randomly generated string using the provided key as seed. Note that even though it involves 
randomization, the same input will always get mapped to the same output when using the same key. Essentially, 
this is a keyed hash.
“Command Name” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping
Having partitioned all linux/unix commands into seven different groups based on their functionality, this 
anonymization method replaces each command name with the label of the corresponding group that each 
command belongs to.  Below we list the seven groups of commands that we used.
Table 2. Group Subset Labels for Unix Commands
“File” “Connect” “Edit” “Program” “Text” “Status” “Miscellaneous”
pwd
cd
ls
rm
mv
cp
chmod
mkdir
rmdir
find
file
in
locate
ssh
sftp
telnet
ftp
pine
elm
logout
lynx
wget
mail
vi
pico
vim
emacs
gvim
xemacs
jove
nedit
dtpad
gcc
make
lex
yacc
lint
ctrace
gdb
gcj
ocaml
gmake
grep
cat
wc
sort
more
less
echo
date
who
finger
ps
talk
top
“all other commands that 
does not fall in one of the 
previous categories”
4.3  Begin Time Field Anonymization   [Field 2]
The second field in a process accounting record for potential anonymization is the “Begin Time” Field.  This 
field is defined as follows:
                                     ac_btime: beginning system time for the process 
The “Begin Time” field is potentially a valuable analysis field for correlating process behavior with the time 
certain events occurred. However, there may be situations when correlating behavior with times reveals private 
information such that anonymization at different levels is desirable. 
The “Begin Time” field has three anonymization options: (1) Time Unit Annihilation, (2) Random Time Shift, 
and (3) Enumeration. Figure 5 shows the “Begin Time” field’s GUI for anonymization options.  By clicking in 
the circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become 
highlighted/darken while the unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options for each field are 
mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one 
anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization option 
needs to be selected.  
Figure 5. Begin Time Anonymization GUI
“Begin Time” Field Anonymization Option (1): Time Unit Annihilation
Using this anonymization method, any time component (year, month, day, hour, minute, or second) can be 
annihilated—set to zero. This is a generalization of truncation which would always make the granularity of time 
rougher.  Note, by selecting odd combinations of values (e.g., month and hour), you could make it so records 
no longer appear to be in order.
“Begin Time” Field Anonymization Option (2): Random Time Shift
In some cases it may be important to know how far apart two events are temporally without knowing exactly 
when they happened. For this reason we introduce the random time shift anonymization method, where all 
timestamps are shifted by a random variable. The user can set the upper and the lower limits of the random 
variable. This is mostly to prevent times that occur far in the future and would indicate anonymization had 
been done. For example, a purely random integer would likely send the dates millennia into the future.
“Begin Time” Field Anonymization Option (3): Enumeration
In this anonymization method the records are sorted into sequential timestamp order using a local sort window 
set by the user (See details of this sliding window implementation in section 3.6).  Inter-arrival time between 
processes are not preserved, only the sequence. In fact, even the start time of the first record is not preserved.
4.4 “User ID”/”Group ID” Anonymization [Fields 3,4]
The third and fourth fields in a process accounting record for potential anonymization are the “User ID” and 
“Group ID” Fields.  These fields are defined as follows:
ac_uid: user ID associated with the process
ac_gid: group ID associated with the process
While these ID fields are potentially the most valuable for analyzing user behavior, there may be situations 
when it is desirable to look at other behavior (such as command usage) independent of what specific users are 
involved. Thus, it is prudent, for privacy’s sake, to anonymize these fields when individuals users do not need 
to be identified. Note that depending on the anonymization option chosen, one can still correlate all actions by 
a particular user, they just will be unable to determine who that user is.
Figure 6 shows the “User ID” / “Group ID” fields’ GUI for anonymization options. Either ID Field can be 
anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.   By clicking in the circle next to the 
selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become highlighted/darken while the 
unselected options will become faded.  Anonymization options for each field are mutually exclusive (no more 
than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one anonymization option is selected as a 
default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization option needs to be selected.  
Figure 6. User ID/Group ID Anonymization GUI
Each of these ID fields has three anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, and (3) 
Keyed Randomization.   
“User ID”/”Group ID” Fields Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“User ID”/”Group ID” Fields Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will replace the input value with a random variable from 0 to 65535. In other 
words, a permutation on the set of all possible IDs is performed.  Thus data can be correlated to a particular 
user/group even though the true identity of the user/group is unknown.  Since this algorithm is table based, 
anonymization between different logs done at different times will have different mappings.
“User ID”/”Group ID” Fields Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value [0…65635] using the provided key as seed. This is done through keyed hash algorithm.  This 
means that even though the same user/group will always map to the same value (using a fixed key), the 
converse is not true. In other words, it is possible that two or more IDs map to the same value since the hash 
function is not injective.  For less than 256 distinct users, such a collision is statistically unlikely, though.
4.5  Time Usage (User Time/System Time/Elapsed Time) Anonymization [Fields 5,6,7]
  
The fifth, sixth, and seventh fields in a process accounting record for potential anonymization are the “User 
Time”, “System Time”, and “Elapsed Time” fields, collectively called the Time Usage Fields and defined as 
follows:
ac_utime: time spent in user space for the process
ac_stime: time spent in kernel space for the process (accurate to 0.01 second)
ac_etime: total elapsed time for the process (greater than or equal to ac_utime + ac_stime)
also known as “wall clock” or real-time (accurate to a second)
{Note: these fields are reported in seconds with different accuracy}
The Time Usage Fields are the most valuable field for resource accounting and billing when mapped to User 
IDs or Group IDs, however, there may be situations when it is desirable not to reveal resource consumption. 
In general, the anonymization of any of these fields may destroy the relationship between them. It is known 
that User Time + System Time ≥ Elapsed Time. Since the relationship between the fields may be destroyed 
after anonymization, the SCRUB-PA tool informs the user of this possibility through a pop-up window.
Figure 7 shows the Time Usage fields’ GUI for anonymization options. Each Time Usage Field can be 
anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.  Then by clicking in the circle next to the 
selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become highlighted/darken while the 
unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options for each field are mutually exclusive (no more 
than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one anonymization option is selected as a 
default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization needs to be used.  
          Figure 7. Time Usage Anonymization GUI  (User Time/System Time/Elapsed Time)
Each of the Time Usage Fields has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping.   
“Time Usage” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Time Usage” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will replace the input value with a random value from 0 to 65535. This is done 
by creating a random permutation. Thus, a time of x seconds that maps to y seconds will do so for every entry 
in the log.  However, these mappings will likely change between different runs on different logs. Note that 
relationships such as one process taking longer than another are completely destroyed.
“Time Usage” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as a seed. We implement this through a type of keyed hash.  Thus, 
this mapping remains consistent through runs on different logs as long as the same key is used. Note that 
relationships such as one process taking longer than another are completely destroyed. Furthermore, since a 
hash is used on a small space of values, collisions are likely.
“Time Usage” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping
This option maps all zero input values to zero and all non-zero input values to one. 
4.6 Accounting Flag/Controlling TTY/ExitCode Anonymization [Fields 8,9,10]
The eighth, ninth, and tenth fields in a process accounting record for potential anonymization are the 
“Accounting Flag”, “Controlling TTY”, and “ExitCode” fields.  These fields are defined as follows:
ac_flag: accounting flags
S: process was executed by the superuser
F: process ran after a fork, but without exec
D: process generated a core file when it exited
X: process was terminated by signal
ac_tty: TTY which sent the command to launch the process
ac_exitcode: a status code that indicates how the process terminated
  EXIT_SUCCESS
  EXIT_FAILURE
The “Accounting Flag” and “Controlling TTY” fields are potentially valuable fields for analysis since they may 
provide information correlating a command to a user or process. However, there may be situations when 
correlating behavior reveals private information such that anonymization at different levels is desirable.  The 
“ExitCode” field reveals behavior about the process itself which may or may not correlate to private 
information, however, a mechanism for anonymizing this field is provided for cases when it is desired. 
Figure 8 shows the “Accounting Flag” / “Controlling TTY” / “ExitCode” fields’ GUI for anonymization 
options. Each of these fields may be anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.  
Then by clicking in the circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option will 
become highlighted/darken unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options for each field are 
mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one 
anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization option 
needs to be used.  
Figure 8. “Accounting Flag”/”Controlling TTY”/”Exitcode” Anonymization GUI
The “Accounting Flag” field has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization and (4) Grouping.   
“Accounting Flag” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Accounting Flag” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
For the “Accounting Flag” field, input values are replaced with a random number from 0 to 255 masked with 
0x0001011. This creates a permutation on the set of possible values that is dependent on the internal state of 
the PRNG and the details of the log file.
“Accounting Flag” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a type of keyed hash.  Because 
of the small input space, hash collisions are likely. However, mappings are the same between different logs if 
the same key is used.
“Accounting Flag” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping
For the “Accounting Flag” field, the input is replaced by an integer representing the number of non-zero bits in 
the original value.
The “Controlling TTY” field has three anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, and 
(3) Keyed Randomization.   
“Controlling TTY” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Controlling TTY” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
For the TTY field, input values are replaced with a random number from 0 to 65535. This is done by creating a 
random permutation. However, these mappings will likely change between different runs on different logs.
“Controlling TTY” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a type of keyed hash.  Hash 
collisions are unlikely if there are less than 256 distinct TTYs in a log. Also, mappings are the same between 
different logs if the same key is used.
The “ExitCode” field has two anonymization options: (1) Black Marker and (2) Grouping.   
“ExitCode” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“ExitCode” Field Anonymization Option (2): Grouping
For the “ExitCode” field, all non-zero values are mapped to one and zero values are left zero.
4.7 Chars Transferred/Blocks Read or Written Anonymization [Fields 11,12]
The eleventh and twelfth fields in a process accounting record for potential anonymization are the “Chars 
Transferred” and the “Blocks Read or Written” fields.  These fields are defined as follows:
ac_io: number of characters transferred by the process
ac_rw: number of blocks read or written by the process 
The “Chars Transferred” and “Blocks Read or Written” fields reveal behavior about the process itself which 
may or may not correlate to private information, however, mechanisms for anonymizing these fields are 
provided for cases when it is desired. 
Figure 9 shows “Chars Transferred” / “Blocks Read or Written” fields’ GUI for anonymization options. Each 
of these fields may be anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.  Then by clicking 
in the circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become 
highlighted/darken while the other options not selected will become faded. Anonymization options for each 
field are mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one 
anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization needs to 
be done.
Figure 9. “Chars Transferred”/”Blocks Read or Written” Anonymization GUI
The “Chars Transferred” field has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping.   
“Chars Transferred” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Chars Transferred” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will create a random permutation on the set of possible values. This random 
permutation is dependent upon the state of the PRNG and the log file itself.  Thus, the mapping will likely 
change for different logs.
“Chars Transferred” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a keyed hash. This means that 
logs anonymized at different times use the same mapping if the same key is used. 
“Chars Transferred” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping
This options maps every non-zero value to one, while every zero value is left zero.
The “Blocks Read or Written” fields has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure 
Randomization, (3) Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping.   
“Blocks Read or Written” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Blocks Read or Written” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will create a random permutation on the set of possible values. This random 
permutation is dependent upon the state of the PRNG and the log file itself.  Thus, the mapping will likely 
change for different logs.
“Blocks Read or Written” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a keyed hash. This means that 
logs anonymized at different times use the same mapping if the same key is used. 
“Blocks Read or Written” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping
This options maps every non-zero value to one, while every zero value is left zero.
4.8 Minor Pagefaults/Major Pagefaults Anonymization [Fields 13,14]
The thirteenth and fourteenth fields in a process accounting record for potential anonymization are the “Minor 
Pagefaults” and the “Major Pagefaults” fields.  These fields are defined as follows:
ac_minflt: number of minor pagefaults. Minor pagefaults do not require physical I/O. Any 
process doing a read or write to something that is in the page will get a minor page fault.
ac_majflt: number of major page faults. Major pagefaults cause pages to be read from disk 
including pages read from buffer cache.
The “Minor Pagefaults” and “Major Pagefaults” fields reveal behavior about the process itself which may or 
may not correlate to private information. However, mechanisms for anonymizing these fields are provided for 
cases when it is desired. 
Figure 10 shows “Minor Pagefaults”/”Major Pagefaults” fields’ GUI for anonymization options. Each of these 
fields may be anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.  Then by clicking in the 
circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become 
highlighted/darken while the unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options for each field are 
mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one 
anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization needs be 
performed.  
Figure 10. “Minor Pagefaults”/”Major Pagefaults” Anonymization GUI
The “Minor Pagefaults”/”Major Pagefaults” fields have four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure 
Randomization, (3) Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping. 
“Minor/Major Pagefaults” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Minor/Major Pagefaults” Field Anonymization Option (2) Pure randomization
The pure randomization option will create a random permutation on the set of possible values. This random 
permutation is dependent upon the state of the PRNG and the log file itself.  Thus, the mapping will likely 
change for different logs.
“Minor/Major Pagefaults” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a keyed hash. This means that 
logs anonymized at different times use the same mapping if the same key is used. 
“Minor/Major Pagefaults” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping 
Using the predefined groups seen in Table 3, our tool replaces every input value with the corresponding label 
of the group that it belongs.
        Table 3. Minor Pagefaults/Major Pagefaults Groups
4.9 Memory Usage/Number of Swaps Anonymization [Fields 15,16]
The fifteenth and sixteenth process fields in a accounting record for potential anonymization are the “Memory 
Usage” and the “Number of Swaps” fields.  These fields are defined as the following:
ac_mem:   average amount of memory in units of 8K (pages) that is used by the process.
ac_swaps:  number of memory swaps
The “Memory Usage” and “Number of Swaps” fields reveal behavior about the process itself which may or 
may not correlate to private information. However, mechanisms for anonymizing these fields are provided for 
cases when it is needed. 
Figure 11 shows “Memory Usage” / “Number of Swaps” fields’ GUI for anonymization options. Each of 
these fields may be anonymized independently by clicking on the box next to each Field.  Then by clicking in 
the circle next to the selected anonymization option, the information about that option will become 
highlighted/darken while the unselected options will become faded. Anonymization options for each field are 
mutually exclusive (no more than one anonymization option per field may be selected).  Although one 
anonymization option is selected as a default for each field (usually the first option) no anonymization needs be 
done.  
Input:
Value Range
Output:
Group Subset Labels
0 0
1…999 500
1000 and above 1000
Figure 11. Memory Usage/Number of Swaps Anonymization GUI
The “Memory Usage” field has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping. 
“Memory Usage” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Memory Usage” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will create a random permutation on the set of possible values. This random 
permutation is dependent upon the state of the PRNG and the log file itself.  Thus, the mapping will likely 
change for different logs.
“Memory Usage” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a keyed hash. This means that 
logs anonymized at different times use the same mapping if the same key is used. 
“Memory Usage” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping 
Using the predefined groups seen in Table 4, our tool replaces every input value with the corresponding label 
of the group that it belongs.
Table 4. Subset Groupings for Memory Usage Field
Input:
Value Range
Output:
Group Subset Labels
0 0
1…999 500
1000…2000 1500
2001 and above 2000
The “Number of Swaps” field has four anonymization options: (1) Black Marker, (2) Pure Randomization, (3) 
Keyed Randomization, and (4) Grouping. 
“Number of Swaps” Field Anonymization Option (1): Black Marker
The black marker option will replace this field with a zero.
“Number of Swaps” Field Anonymization Option (2): Pure Randomization
The pure randomization option will create a random permutation on the set of possible values. This random 
permutation is dependent upon the state of the PRNG and the log file itself.  Thus, the mapping will likely 
change for different logs.
“Number of Swaps” Field Anonymization Option (3): Keyed Randomization
The keyed randomization option will initially ask the user for a key and then map the original value in the field 
to a random value using the provided key as seed. This is implemented through a keyed hash. This means that 
logs anonymized at different times use the same mapping if the same key is used. 
“Number of Swaps” Field Anonymization Option (4): Grouping 
This options maps every non-zero value to one, while every zero value is left zero.
5.0 Summary
In this paper we describe SCRUB-PA, a tool that performs process accounting log anonymization by allowing a 
user to select multi-level options for anonymizing each field within a process accounting record.  This 
functionality is motivated by the problem of sharing process accounting logs between organizations while 
simultaneously preserving the privacy of sensitive information within each log. Realizing organizations have 
different security environments with different levels of privacy requirements, the multiple anonymization 
options for each field allow flexibility for selecting anonymization schemes that match different environments.  
It is our hope that SCRUB-PA becomes a valuable tool for security engineers, system administrators, 
developers, and researchers who want to share process accounting information without revealing sensitive 
information.  A mailing list for SCRUB-PA support is linked off the SCRUB-PA download webpage:
<http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/Scrub-PADownLoad.html>.
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